{"id":1616,"date":"2018-10-17T15:49:31","date_gmt":"2018-10-17T20:49:31","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/?p=1616"},"modified":"2018-11-09T12:22:29","modified_gmt":"2018-11-09T17:22:29","slug":"a-philosophy-of-becoming-with-as-becoming-alongside","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/a-philosophy-of-becoming-with-as-becoming-alongside\/","title":{"rendered":"A philosophy of &#8220;becoming with&#8221; as &#8220;becoming alongside&#8221;"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In foundational research, I went through a philosophical shift from &#8220;being&#8221; (in the sense of <a href=\"https:\/\/mitpress.mit.edu\/books\/being-world\">Hubert Dreyfus&#8217; reading of Heidegger<\/a>) towards &#8220;becoming&#8221;\u00a0 &#8212; as I was writing a finalization of <a href=\"http:\/\/openinnovationlearning.com\/online\/\"><em>Open Innovation Learning<\/em><\/a>\u00a0in Chapter 9.\u00a0 As I reflect more, my view of systems as living can be expressed as &#8220;<strong>becoming with<\/strong>&#8220;, and more precisely &#8220;<strong>becoming alongside<\/strong>&#8220;.<\/p>\n<p>This is influenced not so much directly from philosophy, but from the ecological anthropology of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.abdn.ac.uk\/socsci\/people\/profiles\/tim.ingold\">Tim Ingold<\/a>, as indicated in &#8220;<a href=\"#ingold_2013_suomen\">Anthropology Beyond Humanity<\/a>&#8221; in 2013.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>I conclude with just two proposals.<\/p>\n<p>First, every animate being is fundamentally a <em>going on<\/em> in the world. Or more to point, to be animate &#8212; to <em>be alive<\/em> &#8212; is to become. And as <a href=\"#haraway_2008_when\">Haraway (2008<\/a>: 244) stresses, \u2018becoming is always becoming <em>with<\/em>\u2014in a contact zone where the outcome, where who is in the world, is at stake\u2019.<\/p>\n<p>Thus whether we are speaking of human or other animals, they are at any moment what they have become, and what they have become depends on whom they are with. If the Saami have reindeer on the brain, it is because they have grown up with them, just as the reindeer, for their part, have grown up with the sounds and smells of the camp.\u00a0 [&#8230;.]<\/p>\n<p>My preference [&#8230;] would be to think of animate beings in the grammatical form of the <em>verb<\/em>. Thus \u2018to human\u2019 is a verb, as is \u2018to baboon\u2019 and \u2018to reindeer\u2019. Wherever and whenever we encounter them, humans are humaning, baboons are babooning, reindeer reindeering. Humans, baboons and reindeer do not <em>exist<\/em>, but humaning, babooning and reindeering <em>occur &#8212;\u00a0<\/em>they are ways of carrying on (<a href=\"#ingold_2011_being\">Ingold 2011<\/a>: 174\u2013175).<\/p>\n<p>Secondly, my \u2018anthropology beyond the human\u2019 would be just that: it would be anthropology, not ethnography, and it would be beyond the human, not multispecies.<\/p>\n<p>We have already seen that a relational approach to human and animal becoming refutes the logic of the multispecies. But it also tells us that in our inquiries we join <em>with<\/em>, and learn <em>from<\/em>, the human and animal becomings (<a href=\"#ingold_2013_prospect\">Ingold 2013a<\/a>: 6\u20139) alongside which we carry on our own lives.\u00a0 [&#8230;.]<\/p>\n<p>Thus in anthropology we do not make studies <em>of<\/em> people, or indeed <em>of<\/em> animals. We study <em>with<\/em> them (<a href=\"#ingold_2013_making\">Ingold 2013b<\/a>: 2\u20134). The aim of such study is not to seek a retrospective account, looking back on what has come to pass. It is rather to move forward, in real time, along with the multiple and heterogeneous becomings with which we share our world, in an active and ongoing exploration of the possibilities that our common life can open up. And just as in life, becoming continually overtakes being, so in scholarship the scope of anthropology must forever exceed the threshold of humanity.\u00a0 [<a href=\"#ingold_2013_suomen\">Ingold 2013-05<\/a>, pp. 20-21, editorial paragraphing added]<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong><a id=\"haraway_2008_when\"><\/a>Haraway, D<\/strong>. 2008. <em>When Species Meet<\/em>. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a id=\"ingold_2011_being\"><\/a>Ingold, T<\/strong>. 2011. <em>Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge and Description<\/em>. Abingdon: Routledge.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a id=\"ingold_2013_prospect\"><\/a>Ingold, T<\/strong>. 2013a. Prospect. In T. Ingold and G. P\u00e1lsson (eds), <em>Biosocial Becomings: Integrating Social<\/em><br \/>\n<em>and Biological Anthropology<\/em>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a id=\"ingold_2013_making\"><\/a>Ingold, T<\/strong>. 2013b. <em>Making: Anthropology, Archaeology, Art and Architecture<\/em>. Abingdon: Routledge.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>Thinking of relations between beings as verbs, rather than beings as nouns, gives more a feeling of time, if not motion.<\/p>\n<p>This publication was officially presented as the\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.antropologinenseura.fi\/en\/events\/events-archive-2008-2015\/\"><em>Edward Westermarck Memorial Lecture<\/em>\u00a0at the Finnish Anthropological Society in May 2013<\/a>.\u00a0 A less formal reading of the paper was <a href=\"http:\/\/www.arts.mq.edu.au\/news_and_events\/events\/university_events\/anthropology_beyond_humanity\">recorded at Macquarie University in October 2013<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" title=\"Anthropology beyond humanity - Professor Timothy Ingold\" width=\"500\" height=\"281\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/kqMCytCAqUQ?feature=oembed\" frameborder=\"0\" allow=\"accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share\" referrerpolicy=\"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\" allowfullscreen><\/iframe><\/p>\n<p><em>Becoming-with<\/em>\u00a0doesn&#8217;t derive as cleanly from the <a href=\"https:\/\/philosophynow.org\/issues\/61\/Being_and_Becoming\">metaphysics of being and becoming<\/a> extending back to the ancient Greeks.\u00a0 It relates alongside\u00a0<em>ecological anthropology<\/em>, which can be placed alongside a more general context of <em>ecological epistemology<\/em>, for which a citable definition in philosophy is relatively recent.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><strong>Ecological epistemology<\/strong> (EE) demarcates an area of convergence between contemporary theories whose common core is the recognition of the agency of natural processes, objects, and materials. EE encompasses the knowledge emerging from the assumption of symmetry between things and thought, human and nonhuman beings, and historical and natural processes. The claim of a symmetrical ontology developed in the framework of the new philosophy of materialism has demanded intense work in order to overcome philosophical constructivism that takes knowledge as a mental construct, regardless of its material base. The idealist perspective in this approach takes knowledge as a representation of reality, which is processed through the logical operation of abstraction and detachment from its empirical object. The assumption of symmetry leads to a knowledge no longer \u201cabout\u201d but \u201cwith\u201d the other human and nonhuman beings. From this perspective, EE avoids diluting culture into nature or assimilating nature into culture but seeks to merge the human and natural histories considering all, nonhumans and humans, coresidents, and \u201cco-citizens\u201d of the same world. [<a href=\"#2016_carvalho_ecological\">Carvalho, 2016<\/a>]<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><em>Ecological epistemology<\/em> relates alongside <em>ecological anthropology<\/em>, that relates alongside the\u00a0<em>ecological psychology<\/em> that introduced a <em><a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1086\/698358\">theory of affordances<\/a><\/em>.\u00a0 Here&#8217;s footnote 310, from <em>Open Innovation Learning<\/em>\u00a0section 9.2, that places Ingold alongside <a href=\"https:\/\/monoskop.org\/James_J._Gibson\">J.J. Gibson<\/a>, alongside <a href=\"http:\/\/www.interculturalstudies.org\/Bateson\/biography.html\">Gregory Bateson<\/a>\u00a0and an <em><a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.21018\/rjcpr.2016.3.214\">Ecology of Mind<\/a><\/em>.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Ecological anthropology, as practiced by Tim Ingold, builds on the ecological psychology of J.J. Gibson.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Gibson wanted to know how people come to perceive the environment around them. The majority of psychologists, at least at the time when Gibson was writing, assumed that they did so by constructing representations of the world inside their heads&#8230;.. The mind, then, was conceived as a kind of data-processing device, akin to a digital computer, and the problem for the psychologist was to figure out how it worked. But Gibson\u2019s approach was quite different. It was to throw out the idea, that has been with us since the time of Descartes, of the mind as a distinct organ that is capable of operating upon the bodily data of sense. Perception, Gibson argued, is not the achievement of a mind in a body, but of the organism as a whole in its environment, and is tantamount to the organism\u2019s own exploratory movement through the world. If mind is anywhere, then, it is not \u2018inside the head\u2019 rather than \u2018out there\u2019 in the world. To the contrary, it is immanent in the network of sensory pathways that are set up by virtue of the perceiver\u2019s immersion in his or her environment. Reading Gibson, I was reminded of the\u00a0teaching of that notorious maverick of anthropology, Gregory Bateson. The mind, Bateson had always insisted, is not limited by the skin (<a href=\"#bateson_1972_form\">Bateson 1973<\/a>: 429) (<a href=\"#ingold_2000_general\">Ingold, 2000b<\/a>, pp. 2\u20133).<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><a id=\"bateson_1972_form\"><\/a>Bateson, Gregory. 1972. \u201cForm, Substance, and Difference.\u201d In <em>Steps to an Ecology of Mind<\/em>, 1987 reprint, 454\u201371. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>These are background contexts for a paradigm of co-responsive movement, in\u00a0<em>Open Innovation Learning<\/em>\u00a0section 9.2.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>Co-responsive movement<\/em> is a <em>joining with<\/em>, in an ongoing sympathy of living things going along together. Joining with is an &#8220;interpenetration of lifelines in the mesh of social life \u2026 in a world where things are continually coming into being through processes of growth and movement&#8221; in a generative form when contrary forces of tension and friction are pulled tightly into a knot. This is in contrast with &#8220;joining up&#8221; as assemblies that can &#8220;be a readily decomposed as composed&#8221;. &#8220;Untying the knot &#8230; is not a disarticulation or decomposition. It does not break things into pieces. It is rather a casting off, whence lines once bound together go their separate ways&#8221;.<sup>320<\/sup><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><sup>320<\/sup> Joining <em>up<\/em> can more formally be called <em>interstitial differentiation<\/em>. Joining with is <em>exterior articulation<\/em>, as in agencement traced to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, assemblage used by Manuel DeLanda, or compositionism advanced by Bruno Latour (<a href=\"#ingold_2017_on\">Ingold, 2017<\/a>, pp. 13\u201315).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>The fine distinction between &#8220;<em>becoming-with<\/em>&#8221; and &#8220;<em>becoming-alongside<\/em>&#8221; shows up in a reference to <a href=\"#ingold_2017_on\">Ingold (2017)<\/a> in footnote 322 of <em>Open Innovation Learning<\/em>\u00a0section 9.2.\u00a0 While &#8220;<em>with<\/em>&#8221; is not exclusively restricted to beings and\/or things at a single point in time, &#8220;alongside&#8221; better suggests parallel sequentiality of those beings with a passage of time.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Co-responding &#8220;is the process by which beings or things literally answer to one another over time, for example in the exchange of letters or words in conversation, or of gifts, or indeed in holding hands&#8221;<sup>321<\/sup>. Members co-responding with each other carry on alongside one another over time, answering contrapuntally.<sup>322<\/sup> A theory of co-responding was foreshadowed in John Dewey\u2019s social view of communication, meaning &#8220;the attainment of a certain \u2018like-mindedness\u2019, enabling those with different experiences of life, both young and old, to carry on together&#8221;.<sup>323<\/sup> This sense of communication is &#8220;not about the exchange of information, as communication is often understood today; it is rather about forging a concordance&#8221;.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><sup>321<\/sup>I prefer the more active labels of co-responsive and co-responding, for which Ingold builds a theory of human correspondence. &#8220;I propose the term <em>correspondence<\/em> to connote their affiliation. Social life, then, is not the articulation but the correspondence of its constituents. [&#8230;.] The sense in which I <em>do<\/em> intend the term differs from this precisely as filiation differs from alliance. It is not transverse, cutting across the duration of social life, but longitudinal, going along with it&#8221; (<a href=\"#ingold_2017_on\">Ingold, 2017<\/a>, p. 14).<\/p>\n<p><sup>322<\/sup> Whereas articulation associates with &#8220;<em>and<\/em>&#8220;, co-responding associates with &#8220;<em>with<\/em>&#8220;. &#8220;The distinction between the kinds of work done here with these little words \u2018and\u2019 and \u2018with\u2019 is all-important. The logic of the conjunction is articulatory; that of the preposition differential. The limbs and muscles of the body, the stones and timbers of the cathedral, the voices of choral polyphony or the members of the family: these are not added to but carry on <em>alongside<\/em> one another. Limbs move, stones settle, timbers bind, voices harmonize, and family members get along through the balance of friction and tension in their affects. They are not \u2018and . . . and . . . and\u2019 but \u2018with . . . with . . . with\u2019, not additive but contrapuntal. In answering \u2013 or responding \u2013 to one another, they co-respond&#8221; (<a href=\"#ingold_2017_on\">Ingold, 2017<\/a>, p. 14).<\/p>\n<p><sup>323<\/sup> Dewey saw life as coproduced with others, socially. &#8220;Since no living being can perpetuate itself indefinitely, or in isolation, every particular life is tasked with bringing other lives into being and with sustaining them for however long it takes for the latter, in turn, to engender further life. The continuity of the life process is therefore not individual but social&#8221; (<a href=\"#ingold_2017_on\">Ingold, 2017<\/a>, p. 14).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>[Open Innovation Learning] can be seen as opening up communications, sharing artifacts in common and learning in a larger community.<sup>324<\/sup> This takes up &#8220;an approach that understood how time, movement, and growth were together generative of the forms of living things rather than merely ancillary to their expression&#8221;.<sup>325<\/sup><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><sup>324<\/sup> Ingold\u2019s proposal of a theory of human correspondence is cited as concordant with pragmatic philosophy and theory of education. &#8220;Dewey was particularly struck by the affinity between the words \u2018communication\u2019, \u2018community\u2019, and \u2018common\u2019. This, he insisted, is not just an accident of etymology. It rather points to a fundamental condition for the possibility of social life. \u2018Men live in a community\u2019, he wrote, \u2018in virtue of the things which they have in common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common\u2019 (Dewey 1966: 4) (<a href=\"#ingold_2017_on\">Ingold, 2017<\/a>, p. 14)<\/p>\n<p><sup>325<\/sup> Tim Ingold cites Henri Bergson\u2019s Creative Evolution (1911) as turning point in his research.<br \/>\n&#8220;The year was 1983, and I was in the throes of writing a book on the idea of evolution, and on how it had figured in theories of biology, history, and anthropology from the nineteenth century to the present. [&#8230;.] It turned into a Bergson-inspired critique of the entire legacy of Darwinian historicism in the human sciences&#8221; (<a href=\"#ingold_2014_life\">Ingold, 2014<\/a>, p. 157).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>Little words make a difference.\u00a0 My philosophy focused on being; then becoming; then becoming-with; and has refined to becoming-alongside.\u00a0 These are rather fine distinctions.\u00a0 Scholarly writing drives precision.<\/p>\n<h3>References<\/h3>\n<p><a id=\"carvalho_2016_ecological\"><\/a>Carvalho, Isabel. 2016. \u201cEcological Epistemology (EE).\u201d In <em>Encyclopedia of Latin American Religions<\/em>, edited by Henri Gooren, 1\u20133. Springer. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-319-08956-0_19-1\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-319-08956-0_19-1<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a id=\"ingold_2000_general\"><\/a>Ingold, Tim. 2000b. \u201cGeneral Introduction.\u201d In <em>The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill<\/em>, 1\u20137. Routledge.<\/p>\n<p><a id=\"ingold_2013_suomen\"><\/a>Ingold, Timothy. 2013-05. \u201cAnthropology beyond Humanity.\u201d <em>Suomen Antropologi: Journal of the Finnish Anthropological Society<\/em> 38 (3): 5\u201323.<\/p>\n<p><a id=\"ingold_2013_macquarie\"><\/a>Ingold, Tim. 2013-10. <em>Anthropology beyond Humanity<\/em>. Web Video. Sydney, Australia: Macquarie University. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=kqMCytCAqUQ\">https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=kqMCytCAqUQ<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a id=\"ingold_2014_life\"><\/a>Ingold, Tim. 2014. \u201cA Life in Books.\u201d <em>Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute<\/em> 20 (1): 157\u2013159. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1111\/1467-9655.12088\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1111\/1467-9655.12088<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a id=\"ingold_2017_on\"><\/a>Ingold, Tim. 2017. \u201cOn Human Correspondence.\u201d <em>Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute<\/em> 23 (1): 9\u201327. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1111\/1467-9655.12541\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1111\/1467-9655.12541<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Reflecting on my philosophical shift in 2017 from being (i.e. Heidegger), the position towards becoming-with can be further refined to becoming-alongside.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"activitypub_content_warning":"","activitypub_content_visibility":"","activitypub_max_image_attachments":4,"activitypub_interaction_policy_quote":"anyone","activitypub_status":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[23],"tags":[484,486,485,483,427],"class_list":["post-1616","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-philosophy","tag-becoming","tag-becoming-alongside","tag-becoming-with","tag-being","tag-philosophy"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1616","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1616"}],"version-history":[{"count":18,"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1616\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1634,"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1616\/revisions\/1634"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1616"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1616"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1616"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}