{"id":730,"date":"2012-10-16T16:35:47","date_gmt":"2012-10-16T21:35:47","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/?p=730"},"modified":"2012-10-16T16:36:15","modified_gmt":"2012-10-16T21:36:15","slug":"robust-yet-fragile-complexity-or-scale-free-network","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/robust-yet-fragile-complexity-or-scale-free-network\/","title":{"rendered":"Robust Yet Fragile Complexity, or Scale Free Network?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>A mention of &#8220;Robust-Yet-Fragile&#8221; label by resilience author <a title=\"twitter.com\/andrew_zolli\" href=\"http:\/\/twitter.com\/andrew_zolli\">@andrew_zolli<\/a> led me to <a title=\"cds.caltech.edu\/~doyle\/wiki\/index.php?title=Main_Page\" href=\"http:\/\/www.cds.caltech.edu\/~doyle\/wiki\/index.php?title=Main_Page\">John Doyle<\/a>&#8216;s research at Caltech. \u00a0Andrew Zolli writes:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>We rightfully add safety systems to things like planes and oil rigs, and hedge the bets of major banks, in an effort to encourage them to run safely yet ever-more efficiently. Each of these safety features, however, also increases the complexity of the whole. \u00a0Add enough of them, and soon these otherwise beneficial features become potential sources of risk themselves, as the number of possible interactions \u2014 both anticipated and unanticipated \u2014 between various components becomes incomprehensibly large.<\/p>\n<p>This, in turn, amplifies uncertainty when things go wrong, making crises harder to correct: Is that flashing alert signaling a genuine emergency? Is it a false alarm? Or is it the result of some complex interaction nobody has ever seen before? [&#8230;.]<\/p>\n<p>CalTech system scientist\u00a0<a title=\"cds.caltech.edu\/~doyle\/wiki\/index.php?title=Main_Page\" href=\"http:\/\/www.cds.caltech.edu\/~doyle\/wiki\/index.php?title=Main_Page\">John Doyle<\/a>\u00a0has coined a term for such systems: he calls them\u00a0<a title=\"cds.caltech.edu\/~doyle\/wiki\/index.php?title=Main_Page\" href=\"http:\/\/www.cds.caltech.edu\/~doyle\/wiki\/index.php?title=Main_Page\">Robust-Yet-Fragile<\/a>\u00a0\u2014 and one of their hallmark features is that they are good at dealing with anticipated threats, but terrible at dealing with unanticipated ones. As the complexity of these systems grow, both the sources and severity of possible disruptions increases, even as the size required for potential &#8216;triggering events&#8217; decreases \u2014 it can take only a tiny event, at the wrong place or at the wrong time, to spark a calamity.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>In an <a title=\"discovermagazine.com\/2007\/nov\/this-man-wants-to-control-the-internet\" href=\"http:\/\/discovermagazine.com\/2007\/nov\/this-man-wants-to-control-the-internet\">2007 Discover Magazine article<\/a>, <a title=\"twitter.com\/carlzimmer\" href=\"http:\/\/twitter.com\/carlzimmer\">Carl Zimmer<\/a> provides a simplified description of research conducted from a theoretical foundation (in Scale Free Networks) in contrast to that from empirical practicalities in control engineering.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>In the 1990s, studying complex systems of all sorts became something of a fad following the emergence of \u201c<a href=\"http:\/\/discovermagazine.com\/2007\/apr\/whatever-happened-to-chaos-theory\/\">chaos theory<\/a>.\u201d Competing versions of this theory were emerging left and right; chaos was being touted as the science of the future. Doyle was unimpressed by most of the new ideas. \u201cIt was clear to me that they were just so far off the mark,\u201d he says. Doyle made up a name that combined all the trendy buzzwords he came across: \u201cemergilent chaoplexity.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>One reason that Doyle loathes emergilent chaoplexity is because it relies on superficial patterns. Doyle, by contrast, insists that his analyses draw from the gritty details of how things actually work.<\/p>\n<p>As an example, Doyle points to what are known as\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Scale-free_network\" target=\"_&quot;blank&quot;\">scale-free networks<\/a>. Many of these networks\u2014interlinked sets of airports, friends, nerves in the body, and so on\u2014have the same basic structure. A few nodes are highly connected hubs, while most other nodes have only a few connections. Any given small city airport probably connects to just a few others. Passengers rely on being able to transfer at a hub to reach most other places. But if you live in Chicago, you can take a direct flight from O\u2019Hare Airport to hundreds of destinations.<\/p>\n<p>Some researchers, like Albert-L\u00e1szl\u00f3 Barab\u00e1si at the University of Notre Dame, have\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.nd.edu\/%7Ealb\/Publication06\/062%20Diameter%20of%20the%20world%20wide%20web\/Diameter%20of%20the%20world%20wide%20web.pdf\" target=\"_&quot;blank&quot;\">argued<\/a>\u00a0(pdf) that the Internet shares a similar structure and that this accounts for why the Internet keeps humming even when some of its systems fail. Since hubs are rare, failures involving them are even rarer. But should a hub fail, researchers warned, it would lead to catastrophe. Their warning made headlines, with CNN\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/archives.cnn.com\/2000\/TECH\/computing\/07\/26\/science.internet.reut\/index.html\" target=\"_&quot;blank&quot;\">reporting<\/a>\u00a0in 2000: \u201cScientists Spot Achilles\u2019 Heel of Internet.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Doyle was not impressed. \u201cEverybody who knew how the Internet worked was puzzled by all this,\u201d he says. He decided to test the Achilles\u2019 heel theory by joining up with a group of collaborators and\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.pnas.org\/cgi\/content\/short\/102\/41\/14497\" target=\"_&quot;blank&quot;\">mapping<\/a>\u00a0a section of the Internet in unprecedented detail.<\/p>\n<p>In that map, they found no Achilles\u2019 heel. The Internet does have a few large servers at its core, but those servers are actually not very well connected. Each one has only a few links, mainly to other large servers through high-bandwidth connections. Much of the activity that occurs on the Internet actually lies out on its edges, where computers are linked by relatively low-bandwidth connections to small servers; think about how many e-mails office workers send to people in their building compared with how many they send overseas. If one of the big links at the core of the Internet crashed, Doyle and his colleagues discovered, it would not take the Internet down with it. Traffic could simply be rerouted through other big links.<\/p>\n<p>The Internet works spectacularly well, despite the fact that over the past 30 years it has expanded a million-fold, absorbing new technology from BlackBerries to the iTunes music store with hardly any major changes to the basic rules it uses to move data. Doyle now knows why. It\u2019s not just the physical arrangement of cables and servers that makes the Net so robust. Doyle and his colleagues showed that the software that runs the Internet uses feedback, in much the same way a jetliner\u2019s computer does. The Internet can sense changing conditions and adjust itself.<\/p>\n<p>The Internet has two kinds of feedback. It maintains a constantly updated picture of the entire network so that messages can be directed along the fastest routes. It also breaks down those messages and encapsulates them inside standardized packets of data, a little like using the standardized waybills and boxes provided by FedEx. Each packet can take its own path through the Internet. As packets arrive at the recipient\u2019s computer, the message fragments in each packet are extracted and reassembled. Critically, as each packet arrives, it sends back a receipt to the sender\u2019s computer. In heavy traffic, some packets get lost. In response to lost packets, computers slow down the rate at which they send their data, reducing congestion.<\/p>\n<p>Together, these two types of feedback give the Internet a robustness more powerful than anyone anticipated. \u201cThese Internet engineers weren\u2019t control theorists, but they built this incredibly robust network,\u201d Doyle says. \u201cMan, that\u2019s awesome.\u201d Then again, the engineers were doing something that evolution figured out long ago.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Looking at the\u00a0<a title=\"dx.doi.org\/10.1073\/pnas.0501426102\" href=\"http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1073\/pnas.0501426102\">original 2005 PNAS paper<\/a>, Doyle and his coauthors create two models of networks, and then compares them to the real Internet.<!--more--><\/p>\n<blockquote><p>One line of research portrays the Internet as \u2018\u2018scale-free\u2019\u2019 (SF) with a \u2018\u2018hub-like\u2019\u2019 core structure that makes the network simultaneously robust to random losses of nodes yet fragile to targeted attacks on the highly connected nodes or \u2018\u2018hubs\u2019\u2019(1\u20133). The resulting error tolerance with attack vulnerability has been proposed as a previously overlooked \u2018\u2018Achilles\u2019 heel\u2019\u2019 of the Internet. The appeal of such a surprising discovery is understandable, because SF methods are quite general\u00a0and do not depend on any details of Internet technology, economics, or engineering (4, 5).<br \/>\n[&#8230;]<br \/>\nHighly optimized\/organized tolerance\/tradeoffs (HOT) has been proposed as a conceptual framework for capturing the highly organized, optimized, and RYF structure of complex highly evolved systems.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The researchers summarize the findings in a table.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Table 1. SFnet vs. HOTnet and the real Internet<\/p>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><em>Feature<\/em><\/td>\n<td><em>SFnet<\/em><\/td>\n<td><em>HOTnet<\/em><\/td>\n<td><em>Real Internet<\/em><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>High-degree vertices<\/td>\n<td>Core<\/td>\n<td>Periphery<\/td>\n<td>Periphery<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Degree distributions<\/td>\n<td>Power law<\/td>\n<td>Power law<\/td>\n<td>Highly variable<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Generated by<\/td>\n<td>Random<\/td>\n<td>Design<\/td>\n<td>Design<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Core vertices<\/td>\n<td>High degree<\/td>\n<td>Low degree<\/td>\n<td>Low degree<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Throughput<\/td>\n<td>Low<\/td>\n<td>High<\/td>\n<td>High<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Attack tolerance<\/td>\n<td>Fragile<\/td>\n<td>Robust<\/td>\n<td>Robust<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Fragility<\/td>\n<td>High-degree \/ hubs<\/td>\n<td>Low degree \/ core<\/td>\n<td>Hijack network<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>The research concludes that the real internet is more like a highly optimized\/organized tolerance\/tradeoff network than a scale free network.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>It is certainly appealing that SF network models can avoid all Internet-specific structures, such as protocol stacks, technological or economic constraints, and user heterogeneity, yet make interesting and testable predictions. Unfortunately, this fact yields results that collapse when tested with real data or when\u00a0examined by domain experts. Here, we have shown that there exist technological, economic, and graph theoretic reasons why the most important SF claim (i.e., that the Internet has \u2018\u2018hubs\u2019\u2019 that form an Achilles\u2019 heel through which most traffic flows and the loss of which would fragment the Internet and constitute its attackv vulnerability) cannot be (and is not) true for the current router-level Internet. More generally, Table 1 shows that SFnet and HOTnet are opposite in essentially every meaningful sense, and the real Internet network is much more like HOTnet.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>In a\u00a0<a title=\"h30565.www3.hp.com\/t5\/Feature-Articles\/A-Contrarian-Worth-Listening-To-Caltech-Professor-John-Doyle\/ba-p\/1864\" href=\"http:\/\/h30565.www3.hp.com\/t5\/Feature-Articles\/A-Contrarian-Worth-Listening-To-Caltech-Professor-John-Doyle\/ba-p\/1864\">2012 article<\/a>, <a title=\"twitter.com\/klheyman\" href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/klheyman\">Karen Heyman<\/a> wrote critically about scientific knowledge in the popular press as more concerned with internal consistency than external validity.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>In 2000,\u00a0<em>Nature<\/em>\u00a0ran a cover story that warned\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.nature.com\/nature\/journal\/v406\/n6794\/full\/406378a0.html\" rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">the Internet was vulnerable to targeted attacks<\/a>\u00a0on central routers. It built its conclusions on a paper published by the same authors the year before in\u00a0<em>Science<\/em><strong>\u00a0<\/strong>that\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.sciencemag.org\/content\/286\/5439\/509.full\" rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">famously defined \u201cscale free networks,\u201d<\/a>\u00a0(SFN). According to the\u00a0<em>Science<\/em>\u00a0paper, large-scale networks self-organize into SFN, rather than being randomly disorganized, as had been previously assumed. These networks follow a power law distribution (popularly known as the \u201c80\/20 rule\u201d), in which the majority of traffic goes through only a few central hubs.<\/p>\n<p>The follow-up\u00a0<em>Nature\u00a0<\/em>paper, widely covered in the popular press, claimed to have demonstrated that due to the 80\/20 rule of SFN, the majority of Internet traffic went through only\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/h30565.www3.hp.com\/t5\/Feature-Articles\/Configuring-Small-Office-Routers-for-Fun-and-Profit\/ba-p\/1264\" target=\"_blank\">a few central, critical routers<\/a>. While the Internet could survive random failures, a targeted attack against these hubs could leave the entire Internet as useless as a frayed phone chord.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/leecenter.caltech.edu\/doyle-res.html\" rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">John Doyle<\/a>, Professor of Control and Dynamical Systems at\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.cds.caltech.edu\/~doyle\/wiki\/index.php?title=Main_Page\" rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">Caltech<\/a>, has maintained for years that this analysis was not just wrong, but so \u201c<em>comically\u00a0<\/em>wrong\u201d to anyone who knew anything at all about Internet architecture that \u201cmost engineers thought it was a hoax.\u201d As Doyle explains, \u201cThe irony of the claim is that the Internet is incredibly robust to physical challenges\u2014but it\u2019s terribly fragile to more sophisticated, software attacks that leave the routers intact but\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/h30565.www3.hp.com\/t5\/Feature-Articles\/CHEWing-on-Cyber-Threats-in-2012\/ba-p\/1242\" target=\"_blank\">send unwanted packets and malware<\/a>\u00a0to the users.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The author of the\u00a0<em>Nature<\/em>\u00a0paper is the highly respected physicist\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.barabasilab.com\/\" rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">Albert-L\u00e1szl\u00f3 Barab\u00e1si<\/a>, who heads the Northeastern University Center for Complex Research. Doyle praises him as \u201ca maestro, he is brilliant.\u201d And\u00a0<em>that\u2019s<\/em>\u00a0the part that scares Doyle the most.<\/p>\n<p>What rattles Doyle is that this was not a one-off mistake by a well-intended theorist ignorant of how the Internet actually works, but a symptom of how some of the smartest members of the research community have fallen in love with, and misapplied, what has been dubbed the \u201cScience of Complexity.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>In this new approach, theorists (often physicists) apply statistical physics to problems in fields like engineering and biology. After reading through many such papers, Doyle says it\u2019s a recipe: Authors combine the same physics theories in the same definable steps to reach sometimes far-fetched conclusions. \u201cWhat they\u2019ve done is standard operating procedure in the physics literature, but now they\u2019ve stretched it into a regime where we can check the answers,\u201d says Doyle, \u201cIf you\u2019re not a particle physicist, it\u2019s hard to check a measurement in quantum mechanics; but if you\u2019re an engineer or a biologist, you know they make claims about how things work in engineering and biology that are obviously absurd.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThe real stories of how technology and biology work are very complicated and hard to tell,\u201d says Doyle, who admits most of his own papers are\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/h30565.www3.hp.com\/t5\/Feature-Articles\/A-New-Mathematics-for-Computing\/ba-p\/1390\" target=\"_blank\">so mathematically dense<\/a>, they\u2019re all but unreadable except by a handful of experts. By contrast, Doyle says, the complexity papers tell an appealingly simple narrative about how systems work: \u201cTake Domain X, then add some version of \u2018random plus minimal tuning\u2019 such as a scale free network.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Such papers entice journal editors because they appear to have novel insights, and from a purely theoretical viewpoint, their internal logic is consistent. If you\u2019re still wondering why something so self-evidently wrong as the Internet failure paper could make the cover of a peer-reviewed journal, the problem is how \u201cpeer\u201d is defined. More than likely,\u00a0<em>Nature<\/em>\u2019s editors turned to other physicists, or possibly\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www-leibniz.imag.fr\/GRAPH\/english\/overview.html\" rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">graph theorists<\/a>, to vet the paper, because its\u00a0<em>research topic<\/em>\u00a0was\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.scholarpedia.org\/article\/Scale-free_networks\" rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">scale-free networks<\/a>; the Internet was merely a real-world example. In other words, if a reviewer\u2019s concern is the physics of an acoustical theory<em>\u00a0<\/em>that describes\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.phys.unsw.edu.au\/jw\/brassacoustics.html\" rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">how air travels through a French horn<\/a>, nobody\u2019s very likely to check if a sound actually came out.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Doyle has been doing research into Robust Yet Fragile Complexity in biological domains, and has written a brief description in a <a title=\"leecenter.caltech.edu\/booklet.html\" href=\"http:\/\/leecenter.caltech.edu\/booklet.html\">2010 Cal Tech booklet<\/a>.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Biological systems are robust and evolvable in the face of even large changes in environment and system components, yet can simultaneously be extremely fragile to small perturbations. Such universally robust yet fragile (RYF) complexity is found wherever we look. The amazing evolution of microbes into humans (robustness of lineages on long timescales) is punctuated by mass extinctions (extreme fragility). Diabetes, obesity, cancer, and autoimmune diseases are side-effects of biological control and compensatory mechanisms so robust as to normally go unnoticed. RYF complexity is not confined to biology. The complexity of technology is exploding around us, but in ways that remain largely hidden. Modern institutions and technologies facilitate robustness and accelerate evolution, but enable catastrophes on a scale unimaginable without them (from network and market crashes to war, epidemics, and global warming). Understanding RYF means understanding architecture\u2014the most universal, high-level, persistent elements of organization\u2014and protocols. Protocols define how diverse modules interact, and architecture defines how sets of protocols are organized.<\/p>\n<p>Insights into the architectural and organizational principles of networked systems can be drawn from three converging research themes.<\/p>\n<p>(1) With molecular biology\u2019s description of components and growing attention to systems biology, the organizational principles of biological networks are becoming increasingly apparent. Biologists are articulating richly detailed explanations of biological complexity, robustness, and evolvability that point to universal principles.<\/p>\n<p>(2) Advanced technology\u2019s complexity is now approaching biology\u2019s. While the components differ, there is striking convergence at the network level of architecture and the role of layering, protocols, and feedback control in structuring complex multiscale modularity. New theories of the Internet and related networking technologies have led to test and deployment of new protocols for high performance networking.<\/p>\n<p>(3) A new mathematical framework for the study of complex networks suggests that this apparent network-level evolutionary convergence within\/between biology\/technology is not accidental, but follows necessarily from the universal system requirements to be efficient, adaptive, evolvable, and robust to perturbations in their environment and component parts.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>This crossover from biology and engineering dates was first outlined in a <a title=\"dx.doi.org\/10.1073\/pnas.012582499\" href=\"http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1073\/pnas.012582499\">2002 paper by Carlson and Doyle<\/a>.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Highly optimized tolerance (HOT) (1\u20136) is one recent attempt, in a long history of efforts, to develop a general framework for studying complexity. The HOT view is motivated by examples from biology and engineering. Theoretically, it builds on mathematics and abstractions from control, communications, and computing. In this paper, we retain the motivating examples but avoid theories and mathematics that may be unfamiliar to a nonengineering audience. Instead, we aim to make contact with the models, concepts, and abstractions that have been loosely collected under the rubric of a \u2018\u2018new science of complexity\u2019\u2019 (NSOC) (7) or \u2018\u2018complex adaptive systems\u2019\u2019 (CAS), and particularly the concept of self-organized criticality (SOC) (8, 9). SOC is only one element of NSOC\/CAS but is a useful representative, because it has a well-developed theory and broad range of claimed applications.<\/p>\n<p>Table 1. Characteristics of SOC, HOT, and Data<\/p>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><\/td>\n<td>Property<\/td>\n<td>SOC<\/td>\n<td>HOT and Data<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1<\/td>\n<td>Internal configuration<\/td>\n<td>Generic, homogenous, self-similar<\/td>\n<td>Structured heterogeneous, self-dissimilar<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2<\/td>\n<td>Robustness<\/td>\n<td>Generic<\/td>\n<td>Robust, yet fragile<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>3<\/td>\n<td>Density and yield<\/td>\n<td>Low<\/td>\n<td>High<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>4<\/td>\n<td>Max event size<\/td>\n<td>Infinitesimal<\/td>\n<td>Large<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>5<\/td>\n<td>Large event shape<\/td>\n<td>Fractal<\/td>\n<td>Compact<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>6<\/td>\n<td>Mechanism for power laws<\/td>\n<td>Critical internal fluctuations<\/td>\n<td>Robust performance<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>7<\/td>\n<td>Exponent\u00a0?<\/td>\n<td>Small<\/td>\n<td>Large<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>8<\/td>\n<td>? vs. dimension <em>d<\/em><\/td>\n<td>? ? (<em>d<\/em> -1)\/10<\/td>\n<td>? ? 1\/<em>d<\/em><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>9<\/td>\n<td>DDOFs<\/td>\n<td>Small (1)<\/td>\n<td>Large (?)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>10<\/td>\n<td>Increase model resolution<\/td>\n<td>No change<\/td>\n<td>New structures, new sensitivities<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>11<\/td>\n<td>Response to forcing<\/td>\n<td>Homogenous<\/td>\n<td>RobusVariable<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>In Table 1, we contrast HOT\u2019s emphasis on design and rare configurations with the perspective provided by NSOC\/CAS\/SOC, which emphasizes structural complexity as \u2018\u2018emerging between order and disorder,\u2019\u2019 (i) at a bifurcation or phase transition in an interconnection of components that is (ii) otherwise largely random. Advocates of NSOC\/CAS\/SOC are inspired by critical phenomena, fractals, self-similarity, pattern formation, and self-organization in statistical physics, and bifurcations and deterministic chaos from dynamical systems. Motivating examples vary from equilibrium statistical mechanics of interacting spins on a lattice to the spontaneous formation of spatial patterns in systems far from equilibrium. This approach suggests a unity from apparently wildly different examples, because details of component behavior and their interconnection are seen as largely irrelevant to system-wide behavior.<\/p>\n<p>Table 1 shows that SOC and HOT predict not just different but exactly opposite features of complex systems. HOT suggests that random interconnections of components say little about the complexity of real systems, that the details can matter enormously, and that generic (e.g., low codimension) bifurcations and phase transitions play a peripheral role. In principle, Table 1 could have a separate column for Data, by which we mean the observable features of real systems. Because HOT and Data turn out to be identical for these features, we can collapse the table as shown. This is a strong claim, and the remainder of this paper is devoted to justifying it in as much detail as space permits.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>In the search for isomorphisms, crossing over the disciplines from biology to engineering follows the spirit of the systems sciences.<\/p>\n<h3>References<\/h3>\n<p>Carlson, Jean M., and John C. Doyle. 2002. \u201cComplexity and Robustness.\u201d <em>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences<\/em> 99 (90001): 2538\u20132545. doi:10.1073\/pnas.012582499. <a title=\"dx.doi.org\/10.1073\/pnas.012582499\" href=\"http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1073\/pnas.012582499\">http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1073\/pnas.012582499<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Doyle, John C. 2010. \u201cThe Architecture of Robust, Evolvable Networks: Organization, Layering, Protocols, Optimization, and Control.\u201d In <em>The Lee Center for Advanced Networking<\/em>, 12\u201313. Booklet. Pasadena, California: California Institute of Technology. <a title=\"leecenter.caltech.edu\/booklet.html\" href=\"http:\/\/leecenter.caltech.edu\/booklet.html\">http:\/\/leecenter.caltech.edu\/booklet.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Doyle, John C., David L. Alderson, Lun Li, Steven Low, Matthew Roughan, Stanislav Shalunov, Reiko Tanaka, and Walter Willinger. 2005. \u201cThe \u2018robust yet Fragile\u2019 Nature of the Internet.\u201d\u00a0<em>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America<\/em>\u00a0102 (41): 14497\u201314502. doi:10.1073\/pnas.0501426102.\u00a0<a title=\"dx.doi.org\/10.1073\/pnas.0501426102\" href=\"http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1073\/pnas.0501426102\">http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1073\/pnas.0501426102<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Heyman, Karen. 2012. \u201cA Contrarian Worth Listening To: Caltech Professor John Doyle Thinks \u2018Complexity\u2019 Is Over-Simplified.\u201d\u00a0<em>Input Output<\/em>.\u00a0<a title=\"h30565.www3.hp.com\/t5\/Feature-Articles\/A-Contrarian-Worth-Listening-To-Caltech-Professor-John-Doyle\/ba-p\/1864\" href=\"http:\/\/h30565.www3.hp.com\/t5\/Feature-Articles\/A-Contrarian-Worth-Listening-To-Caltech-Professor-John-Doyle\/ba-p\/1864\">http:\/\/h30565.www3.hp.com\/t5\/Feature-Articles\/A-Contrarian-Worth-Listening-To-Caltech-Professor-John-Doyle\/ba-p\/1864<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Zimmer, Carl. 2007. \u201cThis Man Wants to Control the Internet (and You Should Let Him).\u201d\u00a0<em>Discover<\/em>.\u00a0<a title=\"discovermagazine.com\/2007\/nov\/this-man-wants-to-control-the-internet\" href=\"http:\/\/discovermagazine.com\/2007\/nov\/this-man-wants-to-control-the-internet\">http:\/\/discovermagazine.com\/2007\/nov\/this-man-wants-to-control-the-internet<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Zolli, Andrew. 2012. \u201cWant to Build Resilience? Kill the Complexity.\u201d\u00a0<em>Harvard Business Review<\/em>.\u00a0<a title=\"blogs.hbr.org\/cs\/2012\/09\/want_to_build_resilience_kill_the_complexity.html\" href=\"http:\/\/blogs.hbr.org\/cs\/2012\/09\/want_to_build_resilience_kill_the_complexity.html\">http:\/\/blogs.hbr.org\/cs\/2012\/09\/want_to_build_resilience_kill_the_complexity.html<\/a>\u00a0.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Scale-free networks developed from foundations in statistical physics may have less external validity that Robust Yet Fragile Complexity.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"activitypub_content_warning":"","activitypub_content_visibility":"","activitypub_max_image_attachments":4,"activitypub_interaction_policy_quote":"anyone","activitypub_status":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[354,353],"class_list":["post-730","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-systems","tag-robust-yet-fragile","tag-scale-free-networks"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/730","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=730"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/730\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":734,"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/730\/revisions\/734"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=730"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=730"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/coevolving.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=730"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}